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The Deep Structure of Lives
Michael Kubovy
University of Virginia (USA)
Résumé : La psychologie a toujours traité le comportement et l’expérience
comme étant enchâssés dans un flux temporel unidimensionnel, « le courant
du comportement » dans lequel les événements et les actions occupent des in-
tervalles de temps qui ne se chevauchent pas. Pourtant, une analyse phénomé-
nologique révèle que la structure de nos vies est bien plus riche et intéressante.
En utilisant la notion de « quasidécomposabilité » de Herbert Simon, je décris
cette structure comme un assemblage d’épisodes quasi-indépendants se réali-
sant de façon concurrente, et de nature asynchrone. Il s’agit d’une « structure
profonde » des vies contrairement à la conception courante qui conçoit les vies
comme « plates ».
Abstract: Psychology has always treated behavior and experience as embed-
ded in a unidimensional flow in time, the “stream of behavior”. This means
that events and actions occupy non-overlapping time-intervals in this stream.
Nevertheless a phenomenological analysis reveals that the structure of lives is
richer and far more interesting. Using Herbert Simon’s notion of near-decom-
posability, I describe the structure of lives as a composite of nearly independent
strands that run concurrently, and are asynchronous. This is a “deep structu-
re” of lives in contrast to the current conception, which conceives of lives as
“flat”.
In this article I contrast two conceptions of the structure of lives: the
“stream of behavior” framework (which I call “flat”) and the “concurrent
strand” framework (which I call “deep”). The stream of behavior approach has
a distinguished history, going back at least to William James. For example,
William James writes about the stream of thought: “Within each personal
consciousness thought is sensibly continuous” [James 1981, 220]. In contrast,
according to the parallel strand framework, lives consist of multiple concurrent
and asynchronous strands, each endowed with a rich structure.
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As a foil against which to present the new approach, I have chosen the
work of Daniel Kahneman on the measurement of well-being. This choice will
reveal that taking a stance in this matter is not just a debate about theory—it
has practical consequences as well.
1 The unbearable flatness of being
1.1 Kahneman’s two selves
In his Thinking, Fast and Slow, Kahneman distinguishes between two selves,
the “experiencing self”, which answers the question Does it hurt now?, and
the “remembering self”, which answers the question, How bad (or good) was
the experience on the whole? [Kahneman 2011, chap. 35]. In his work
on well-being, he documents how the response of the remembering self to
this question leads to paradoxical results, because it confuses experience with
the memory of it.
The remembering self is sometimes wrong, but it is the one that
keeps score and governs what we learn from living, and it is the
one that makes decisions. What we learn from the past is to
maximize the qualities of our future memories, not necessarily of
our future experience. This is the tyranny of the remembering
self. [Kahneman 2011, 381]
The purpose of this article is to answer a question that was beyond the scope
of Kahneman’s project: what is the structure of the life of this remembering
self?
Here is how he introduces the other self, the experiencing self:
Two different interpretations of the term “utility” have been used
[...] . In its original interpretation, which derives from Bentham,
utility is interpreted in hedonistic terms, as a measure of plea-
sure and pain. [...] Edgeworth [Edgeworth 1881/1967, 98–102]
suggested the idea of what he called the ‘hedonimeter’—an imag-
inary instrument, [...] which could measure the level of pleasure
or pain that an individual was experiencing at any moment and
then plot this as a continuous function of time. The area under
the curve plotted by the hedonimeter would be a measure of the
individual’s happiness for a given period. A developing strand
in the recent research literature of economics is to try to revive
this interpretation of utility as experienced utility. [Kahneman &
Sugden 2005, 162]
The diagram in Figure 1 illustrates this notion of experienced utility, which the
experiencing self computes. According to Kahneman, this duration weighting





EU = area under the curve
Figure 1: Experienced utility (EU)—which is computed by Kahneman’s experi-
encing self—is additive. It is the area under the curve described by a measure of
momentary pleasure or pain.
is the rational way to assign value to an experience. It is rational because it
adheres to a normative rule—the principle of temporal monotonicity: all other
things being equal, the utility of a shorter period of pain is higher than the
utility of a longer period of pain.
And yet, when a person is asked for a retrospective evaluation of an ex-
perience, it is the less rational remembering self that does the evaluation.
Unfortunately, the remembering self does not adhere to the principle of tem-
poral monotonicity. Instead, it seems to obey the two rules of retrospective
evaluation (illustrated in Figure 2):
• Peak-end rule: The retrospective evaluation of an unpleasant episode is
the average of the evaluation of discomfort at its worst and the evalua-
tion of discomfort at its end.
• Duration neglect: The duration of the episode does not affect the retro-
spective evaluation.
The peak-end rule resembles Freytag’s dramatic pyramid (Figure 3)
designed to capture the five acts of a classical play [Freytag 1876]. The peak
in Kahneman’s rule is analogous to the the climax of the play. The end is
analogous to the dénouement (traditionally called the play’s catastrophe, from
the Greek for overturn). In tragedies the protagonist is worse off at the end
than at the beginning; in comedies the protagonist ends up better off.
Several studies provide empirical support for these rules. In one, par-
ticipants viewed a series of plotless films that were either pleasant or highly
aversive and of either short or long (triple) duration [Fredrickson & Kahneman
1993]. Their ratings of the emotional impact of the films were well predicted
by their peak and end ratings, regardless of the length of the films. These
rules also predict the willingness of patients to undergo unpleasant medi-












Figure 2: Two episodes of pain, one short, (a), and one long, (b). The long episode
is composed of the short episode to which a less painful stretch of time has been
added. People prefer the long episode of pain (b) over the short episode (a), even
though the total amount of pain is larger in (b) than in (a). This is a manifestation












Figure 3: Freytag’s pyramid—an attempt to capture the structure of a classical five-
act play [redrawn from Freytag 1876, 100], which resembles Kahneman’s peak-end
rule.
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[Redelmeier, Katz et al. 2003], [Stone, Broderick et al. 2000], [Schneider, Stone
et al. 2011], [Schreiber & Kahneman 2000], to motivating people to exercise
[Hargreaves & Stych 2013]. They have been applied in a variety of areas:
the pricing, advertising or promotion of commercial products, the optimiza-
tion of fundraisers [Baumgartner, Sujan et al. 1997], [De Maeyer & Estelami
2013], [Do, Rupert et al. 2008], [Nasiry & Popescu 2011], [Simonson, Carmon
et al. 1994], and augmenting the appeal of art [Diener, Wirtz et al. 2001],
[Krumhansl & Schenck 1997].1
1.2 Moment-by-moment assessment
As noted earlier, Kahneman believes that the experiencing self is laconic—it
can convey nothing more than momentary assessments of pleasure and pain.
At the same time he also claims that on normative grounds an objective ob-
server should speak on behalf of this taciturn self. Such an observer should
evaluate an unpleasant episode in the life of π by first tracing the curve de-
scribed by π’s moment-to-moment ratings of pain and then obtain the area
under this curve.
In making such a claim, Kahneman is also telling us that the proper mea-
surement of well-being should have little to do with the claims of the Gestalt
psychologists [Wagemans, Elder et al. 2012], [Wagemans, Feldman et al. 2012],
namely that:
Phenomenal experience consists of part-whole structures, config-
urations, or Gestalten. [...] A Gestalt is an integrated, coherent
structure or form, a whole that is different from the sum of the
parts. [Wagemans, Feldman et al. 2012, 1219]
Kahneman’s idea of the experiencing self negates the possibility that the
value of our lives may be different from the sum of the values of its moments.
It represents lives as if they were “flat”. In a flat representation, lives are seen
as a succession of abutting episodes, each containing one activity. This is in
sharp contrast with the Structure of Lives, to be presented in the second half
of this paper.
To understand how Kahneman measures experienced utility, we look to
his Day Reconstruction Method (DRM). He and his colleagues [Kahneman,
Krueger et al. 2004a,b] gave 909 employed women four packets in which they
asked for (a) demographic information, (b) facts about yesterday, (c) feelings
they experienced yesterday, and (d) information about their job. The second
and third packets are central to the DRM. In the second packet (which the
participants knew they could keep to themselves) they first recorded when
1. This supporting evidence is not unanimous [Ariely & Loewenstein 2000], [Geng,
Chen et al. 2013], [Kemp, Burt et al. 2008], [Miron-Shatz 2009], [Robinson, Blissett
et al. 2011], [Rode, Rozin et al. 2007].
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they woke up and when they went to bed. They then constructed a diary of
the preceding day (illustrated in Table 1) with the following instructions:
Think of your day as a continuous series of scenes or episodes in a
film. Give each episode a brief name that will help you remember
it (for example, ‘commuting to work’, or ‘at lunch with B’ [...]).
Write down the approximate times at which each episode began
and ended. The episodes people identify usually last between
15 minutes and 2 hours. Indications of the end of an episode
might be going to a different location, ending one activity and
starting another, or a change in the people you are interacting
with. [Kahneman, Krueger et al. 2004a, 1777]
Table 1: Diary, based on [Kahneman, Krueger et al. 2004b].
Episode Time it Time it Notes to yourself:
















In the third packet (which the participants knew they would turn in) they
answered questions about each episode:
When it occurred (start and end times); what they were doing
(by checking one or more of 16 activities); where they were; with
whom they were interacting; and how they felt, using 12 affect
descriptors. [...] The affect scales ranged from 0 (not at all) to 6
(very much). [Kahneman, Krueger et al. 2004a, 1777]
To obtain a measure of overall positive affect they calculated a mean of
the ratings of happy, warm/friendly, and enjoying myself. Likewise, to get
a measure of overall negative affect they calculated the mean of the ratings
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of frustrated/annoyed, depressed/blue, hassled/pushed around, angry/hostile,
worried/anxious, and criticized/put down.
The results are fascinating. First, the overall measure of positive affect was
much higher than the overall measure of negative affect. As Figure 4 shows,
they differed by 3.4 points on the 7-point scale. Second, participants reported
only mild negative affect (mean rating: 0.7) with relatively low frequency (1/3
of ratings were 0 and of the remaining 2/3, nearly all were 1), and they reported
a complete absence of positive affect rarely (only 3% of the time) [Kahneman,


























Figure 4: Positive affect is higher than negative affect in the DRM data. The error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals, based on data in [Kahneman, Krueger et al.
2004a, Table 1].
As we saw earlier, each woman reconstructed her Yesterday as a sequence
of episodes. Since most of the episodes contained just one activity, each episode
was assigned to one of 16 categories of activities. Disregarding the category
working, which was—by stipulation—present in all the diaries (and consumed
6 hours and 54 minutes per day), I used their Table 1 to calculate an index of
prevalence for each activity: mean hours/day × proportion of sample reporting.
Figure 5 shows the activities in order of prevalence. As is evident from the
figure, the three top activities were eating, relaxing, and watching TV, and the
bottom three were pray/worship/meditate, exercising, and intimate relations.
This diagram points to a troubling implication of the way the DRM is
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Figure 5: Proportion of participants reporting activities, based on data in
[Kahneman, Krueger et al. 2004a, Table 1].
utility must weight activities by their prevalence, then one’s spiritual life, one’s
physical discipline, and one’s intimate life—which presumably are central to
many people’s mental and physical well-being—could only marginally affect
the DRM’s estimate of a person’s objective well-being.
It would be tempting to assign differential weights to episodes by virtue
of the import and gravity of the activities they contain. But Kahneman’s he-
donimetric assessment of experienced utility does not offer us the wherewithal
to do this. Such a weighting would not be in the spirit of assessing moment-
by-moment pleasure or pain, because the significance we attach to an activity
or an event so often depends on its aftermath, which can be known only after
the activity has taken place.
Two rebuttals to this objection come to mind. First, the prevalence of
these activities in the lives of those for whom these activities are central
would be much greater. For avid runners, surely exercise would have a preva-
lence far greater than 1:55 minutes per day per person. Second, we have no
evidence that what a person considers important in life contributes to a per-
son’s well-being.
Undoubtedly these rebuttals raise important empirical questions.
However, when the tool used to assess well-being assumes that lives are flat,
these questions cannot be answered.
1.3 Flatness is the rule
Kahneman tacitly adopted the stream of behavior framework because it has
had no competition in contemporary cognitive science. The earliest empirical
work to adopt this framework was done by Barker and his colleagues [Barker
1963, 1965], [Barker & Wright 1954]. They found that the behavior stream
consists of discrete, qualitatively different, and repeated behavior units. In
Cognitive Science, the focus shifted to the study of the perception of event
structure [Condon & Ogston 1967], [Newtson 1976], [Newtson, Enquist et al.
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1977], [Zacks & Tversky 2001]. Participants in their studies watch films in
which actors perform an activity such as dish-washing or bed-making. While
watching, they tap a key whenever they see a breakpoint, a boundary between
one unit of behavior and the next [Swallow, Zacks et al. 2009]. From these
data, researchers infer which features of the stream of behavior cause us to
parse it into successive “events”. But they do not question the idea that life is
a single stream of behavior. There is no place for concurrent streams within
their framework.
2 The deep structure
Although earlier I promised to address the Structure of Lives from the point
of view of the remembering self, I now must back off, because the term “re-
membering self” is too restrictive. Of course memory plays an important role
in how we experience our lives, but memory is only part of the story.
And while we are rethinking labels, we might ask whether the name of
the experiencing self is apposite. The so-called “tyranny of the remembering
self” implies that it is the self that is central to our experience. And since,
furthermore, Kahneman implies that the output of the experiencing self is by
and large ignored in the management of our lives, it may not be experienced
as a self.
2.1 Lives are nearly decomposable into strands
The Structure of Lives, summarized in Figure 6, is based on the premise that
we experience our lives as a complex system that is (a) hierarchical, and (b)
nearly-decomposable into strands. To characterize strands, we need Herbert A.
Simon’s notion of nearly decomposable (ND) systems.
According to Simon, “a complex system [is] made up of a large number of
parts that interact in a non-simple way. In such systems, the whole is more
than the sum of the parts, [i.e.,] given the properties of the parts and the
laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the properties of
the whole” [Simon 1962, 468]. This captures perfectly how I propose we think
about lives.
Rather than present the systems of differential equations to characterize
nearly decomposable systems (for which the reader may consult [Simon &
Ando 1961]), I will characterize the idea informally, using a metaphor borrowed
from [Simon 2002]. Imagine a building with rooms that have thick exterior and
interior walls. These rooms are divided into thin-walled cubicles. Now suppose
a storm suddenly forces the building into a temperature disequilibrium, so that
there are sizable temperature differences within cubicles, between adjoining
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Suppose also that the storm shut off the heating and the AC, and that the
outside temperature remains steady, and that at this moment we begin to
measure the evolution of the indoor temperatures.
The temperature within cubicles will rapidly become uniform; gradually,
the temperature of the cubicles in each room will approach equality; more
slowly, the temperatures of the different rooms will converge. Finally, the
temperature of the rooms will be equal to the outside temperature.
Now imagine that the building is the life of a person, who we will call π.
The rooms are strands, and the cubicles are substrands. Now suppose that
each cubicle contains a space-heater whose thermostat is set at a different
temperature. The temperatures in different cubicles in the same room, being
poorly insulated from each other, despite the different thermostat settings,
will tend to fluctuate together. This is also true—but to a lesser degree—of
the temperatures in different rooms.
The near-decomposability of lives into strands implies that—over the course
of π’s life—strands will fluctuate together. But in the shorter run, strands will
be independent. (Later I will suggest that such compartmentalization is not
only normal, but an indicator of mental and physical health. Its failure is, at
the very least, an indication of stress.)
Many people have strands such as home, work, school, trans-
portation and transitions, shopping/errands, personal business, and
recreation/entertainment [Jiang, Ferreira et al. 2012]. Each is a collec-
tion of related activities that π tacitly groups together and discriminates from
other strands. Three features characterize each strand:
• π’s role,
• the cast of characters, and
• the place where it typically unfolds.
Table 2 lists likely features of a few common strands.
Table 2: Examples of strands, with primary role, cast, and place
strand role cast place
home parent child(ren) home
work attorney co-workers office




Because π’s strands are determined from a first-person point of view, the
number of strands and the activities constituting each of them is primarily up to
π. If π were asked to generate a catalog of his or her strands, there is no reason
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to expect it to be exhaustive. Such a catalog may justifiably be amended by
an observer (e.g., a therapist) who knows π well. It is even conceivable that
π and the therapist might disagree on the structure of π’s life, and that their
views may never be reconciled. In short, in the approach I am developing here,
there is no need to assert that π’s claims about strands (or any other feature
of his or her life)—to which he or she has privileged access—are incorrigible.
Some strands may be idiosyncratic (a hobby such as drag racing), other
strands may be bound to a culture (such as the “parallel universe” of spirits
in the zār possession cult described by [Boddy 1989]) but other are inevitably
present at some point in all human lives (e.g., relations with parents or
health) and some are always present (food, rest), although their labels
may vary from person to person. In other words, some strands are universal.
They can be based on (a) physiological needs (food, rest), (b) social needs
(friends), (c) roles in the sociological sense (parent, teacher, spouse), (d)
places (your home, your office, the school you attend), or (e) Goffman
frames (bus-queue or medical patient) [Goffman 1974]. If a strand is based
on a role or a frame, a person’s behavior is constrained by it as long as the
person is in it.
From π’s first-person point of view, strands are concurrent and independent
streams carrying the flow of π’s activities and experiences. They are parallel
and independent in three ways:
1. Each strand is a sequence of events that π experiences as potentially
causally-related, often occurring in a fixed place and with a stable cast
of people. When we think (from a first-person perspective) about our
job, we think of it as an organized sequence of activities, even if it is in-
terrupted by sleep or activities from other strands. What William James
says about the continuity of personal consciousness applies perfectly to
strands [James 1981, 231–240]. He points out that even when there is
a time-gap in our consciousness (e.g., due to sleep) we experience the
events after the gap as belonging with the events we experienced before
it, as belonging to the same self. Likewise, even when there is a time-gap
in a strand (e.g., due to sleep) we experience the events after the gap as
belonging with the events we experienced before it, as belonging to the
same strand.
2. With respect to most pairs of strands, we do not experience events in
one to be causally related to events in the other; they are, by and large,
compartmentalized. For example, adults with siblings are likely to ex-
perience events in their work strand as having no effect on their sibling
strand, and vice versa.
3. Strands are asynchronous; they do not share a clock. Imagine that you
are at the office (strand A: work) writing a report, when the phone
rings. It’s the babysitter (strand B: child-care) asking to pick up your
child early. You agree and return to your report. Toward the end of the
day, you remember your promise and get ready to leave early. As you’re
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leaving, it is unlikely that you will remember what you were doing when
the phone rang, although you may remember what you did during your
time at the office.
Since to an outside observer π does not appear to be doing more than one
thing at a time and π appears to be in one place at a time, it is tempting
to describe π’s life as a succession of abutting episodes: what I earlier char-
acterized as a “single-stream” or a “flat lives” conception. For an observer
watching π working on the report at home, π may appear to engage first in
one activity a (taking care of the children), and then another, b (writing the
paper), which is interrupted by a return to a, and so on. activities a and b
appear to be interleaved. From a first-person point of view, however, π did
two things this evening: worked on the report, and took care of the children.
π inhabited two continuing strands (which extend into the past and into the
future, each following its own course) concurrently.
The relation between the inevitable interleaving of activities and the first-
person continuity of strands may be likened to Faulkner’s narrative in As I Lay
Dying. The book is narrated (and therefore must be read) from alternating—
interleaved—points of view. But literary scholars have shown [Ross 1975]
that it is possible to seamlessly stitch together each of the two narratives into
concurrent stories. The transition from one to the other is akin to moving
from a flat stream of events to a world of strands unfolding concurrently.
Exceptions to the near-decomposability of lives into strands are not uncom-
mon. Many mothers of young children, for example, experience an unwelcome
interdependence between work and family [Ashforth 2001], [Michel, Kotrba
et al. 2011], [Nippert-Eng 2008], which can be challenging [Powell & Greenhaus
2010]. The Structure of Lives does not constrain every activity to be a member
of a strand, nor does it forbid an activity to be the member of more than one
strand. Indeed the degree to which a life is nearly decomposable into strands
may vary from individual to individual and from one life-stage to another.
2.2 Activities
Strands consist of activities. As Figure 6 shows, activities are of two kinds:
temporally determinate and temporally diffuse.
Temporally determinate activities can be placed in a time-slot: shopping
or sleeping, for example. Such activities fall into three categories:
1. Unique. An incident is unique if it is an accident (e.g., a fall), a disaster
(natural or caused by humans), or a singular coincidence (e.g., meeting
a long-lost friend on the street).
2. Routine. Most of our activities are routine. Routine activities follow a
script, “a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that defines
a well-known situation” [Schank & Abelson 1977]. For example, we
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all have scripts for different types of restaurant: the formal restaurant
(order–eat–pay), the lunch buffet (take food–eat–pay), the cafeteria (take
food–pay–eat), the fast-food restaurant (order & pay–get food–eat) and
so on.
There are two ways for an activity to be routine:
(a) Scripted. It is repeated but its repetitions are not linked: when
I made breakfast today, I followed the same script as yesterday,
and yet I do not think of today’s breakfast as a continuation of
yesterday’s.
(b) Planned and unhindered. It is planned, and it proceeds accord-
ing to plan. Even though it was my first trip to Santa Fe the
travel was routine because it proceeded according to schedule in a
manner familiar to me from other trips: taxi–check-in–board–fly–
disembark–pick up luggage–taxi.
Most routine activities have a hierarchical structure [Pantic, Pentland
et al. 2007]. A “workout at a gym” in fitness may consist of the
sub-activities drive–check-in–change–treadmill–weights–shower–change–
leave–drive. Each of these can be further broken down to yet smaller-
scale activities. For example, a run on treadmill begins with activate
treadmill and enter settings, each of which may in turn be further de-
composable.
3. Project. As illustrated on the left side of Figure 6, an activity is part of a
project if it is linked (in my mind) to a past or a future event (an activity
or an incident). All projects begin with an initial incident and end with a
terminal incident. The initial incident is a challenge, which is either
(a) self-imposed , when I decide to do something (have a child, get a
degree, write a paper), or
(b) externally imposed , when routine activities are thwarted (my com-
puter crashes; I fall severely ill).
Projects are frequently the topic of narratives. Our propensity to generate
narratives is central to the Structure of Lives.2
2. We do not, however, take a stance on sweeping claims (criticized by [Strawson
2004]) that “each of us constructs and lives a ‘narrative’ [...] this narrative is us,
our identities” [Sacks 1985, 110], that “we are virtuoso novelists, who [...] try to
make all of our material cohere into a single good story” [Dennett 1992, 114], that
“identity itself takes the form of a story, complete with setting, scenes, character,
plot, and theme” [McAdams 2001, 101], or that a person “creates his identity [only]
by forming an autobiographical narrative—a story of his life” [Schechtman 2007, 93].
Although some people formulate “identity narratives”—for example, in memoirs and
autobiographies—they do not play a role in the present account of the structure of
lives. The relation of what psychologists call autobiographical memory [Fivush 2010]
and the Structure of Lives is a worthy topic, the treatment of which is beyond the
scope of this article.










(b) New Testament/Cinderella: hu-
mankind receives many gifts from
God, then falls from grace, but eventu-
ally will achieve redemption and eter-
nal bliss.
Figure 7: Two Vonnegut plot diagrams (redrawn) [Vonnegut 2005].
It is plausible that narratives are the source of both the peak-end rule and
of duration-neglect. Certain literary forms, such as Freytag’s characterization
of a classical play as a pyramid (Figure 3), are indeed marked by the peak-end
rule.
Even so, the peak-end rule may be the exception among narratives we
generate, and a fortiori among those we consume. Few conform to the peak-
end rule or to Freytag’s pyramid. Kurt Vonnegut, for example, produced plot
diagrams for common types of stories [Vonnegut 2005], two of which I redraw
in Figure 7.
Beyond that, even familiar bodily episodes, such as urinary urgency, pro-
vide models of narratives more elaborate than can be described by a peak-end
account. The increasing urgency, illustrated in Figure 8, consists of a sequence
of episodes of tension followed by relief, each reaching a peak more intense than
the preceding one [Chapple, Artibani et al. 2005]. This is of course a pattern
common in suspense narratives.
As we mentioned earlier, the centrality of narrative in human life may also
account for the phenomenon of duration-neglect, which is Kahneman’s main
reason for wanting to replace the remembering self with the experiencing self.
A narrative describes a sequence of events or activities. None of these would
appear in the narrative unless they (a) were rife with emotion and tension,
and (b) advanced the narrative to its conclusion. In narratives, as in episodes
of urinary urgency, only the order of tension-relief events counts. Clock-time
plays little or no role in the narrative of an experience or in literary narratives.
Some activities are not temporally determinate. If their timing is hard to
pinpoint, we say that they are diffuse. Diffuseness is a defining characteristic
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Figure 8: The growth of urinary urgency which resembles the pattern followed by
suspense narratives. The shaded areas represent successive episodes of increasing
urinary urgency. (Redrawn from [Chapple, Artibani et al. 2005, Fig. 1].)
of preoccupations (also called time perspectives [Frank 1939]), such as guilt or
worry. When we become aware of a preoccupation, we rarely register where
we were or when it was that a preoccupation surged (typically unbidden). We
experience preoccupations as infiltrating experiences whose object is either in
the past or in the future, and they rarely take center stage in consciousness.
They may refer to events (a) in the future: positively (expectations, wishes,
daydreams, hopes, plans), or negatively (fears); or (b) in the past: positively
(pride in an achievement), or negatively (guilt, shame, regret).
2.3 Noteworthiness
Noteworthiness is the third central feature of the Structure of Lives.3 It is
a property akin to the perceptual phenomenon of figure-ground segregation
(Figure 9). To say that an incident or a preoccupation is noteworthy is tan-
Figure 9: The segregation of figure from ground as a model for the emergence of an
activity as noteworthy.
tamount to saying that it is in the foreground of one’s life. Furthermore, if a
3. A detailed treatment is beyond the scope of this article.
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strand contains many noteworthy activities, then it is likely to inherit the note-
worthiness of its activities. The concept is essential if we are to understand
how it is possible that people who are suffering physical or psychological pain
can claim that their life is fulfilling.
3 Conclusion
3.1 The standing of these claims
Perhaps the best way to characterize this effort is to say that it is a researcher’s
attempt to give a systematic account of the structure of his experience in
the expectation4 that this account resonates with others. Thus the scientific
standing of the Structure of Lives is not straightforward. On the one hand, it
looks like a description—a phenomenological description—of how we humans
experience our lives. In this repect it is an attempt to answer the question,
“What is it like to have a life?” On the other hand, it looks like a theory—an
attempt to answer the question, “What is the structure of lives?” It would
seem that in any phenomenological discourse such as this, description and
theory are ineluctably intertwined.
This expectation that the Structure of Lives will resonate with others may
remind the reader of the use of acceptability judgments in the study of gen-
erative syntax [Chomsky 1965], [Schütze 2011]. There is, however, a crucial
difference. Acceptability judgments are used as evidence for a complex theory
that posits generative machinery of which we are not conscious. In contrast,
my appeal to the reader is about the Structure of Lives itself, all of which is
available to any human being, who (tautologically) has and lives a life. If it
is deemed a faithful description, no further evidence is required. And even if
further evidence were demanded, where could we find it?
Some readers may think that the Structure of Lives looks like an ontology
(i.e., a formal structure common in information science, e.g., [Smith 2014]).
There are three reasons it is not.
1. It does not adhere to Smith & Ceusters’s fundamental principle of on-
tological realism: “[We] advocate the creation of [...] reference ontolo-
gies designed to embody the representational content of settled science”
[Smith & Ceusters 2010, 140]. Since this is the first time such an attempt
has been made, no settled science is available.
2. It does not readily fit into current ontologies. For example, SUMO,
the ontology developed by Pease offers us the choice of classifying a life
either as a physical entity or as an abstract entity [Pease 2011,
Figure 56, 101]. Neither is acceptable.
4. In the light of many lectures on the topic to a variety of audiences.
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3. It cannot satisfy the Smith, Kusnierczyk et al. requirement that on-
tologies have three levels of entities [Smith, Kusnierczyk et al. 2006,
58]:
• Level 1: the objects, processes, qualities, states, etc., in reality (for
example on the side of the patient);
• Level 2: cognitive representations of this reality on the part of
researchers and others;
• Level 3: concretizations of these cognitive representations in (for
example textual or graphical) representational artifacts.
I consider these in turn:
• Level 1: What is the “reality” captured by the Structure of Lives?
It is phenomenological, i.e., always initially formulated from a first-
person point of view. Nothing rests on the accuracy of π’s account,
even though under some circumstances “reality” may come into
play: a journalist hearing π’s fanciful account of a voyage may
wish to do some fact-checking.
• Level 2: It is not the case that the Structure of Lives is a re-
searcher’s “representation of a single reality”. As I said earlier,
it is my attempt to give a systematic description of the structure
of my experience. If it also describes the structure of the lives of
many other people, then it may be considered a “single reality”,
but not quite in the sense intended by [Smith, Kusnierczyk et al.
2006].
• Level 3: There is no reason (at this early stage) to treat Figure 6 as
a separate “concretization”. It is part and parcel of the Structure
of Lives.
3.2 The value of this approach
In conclusion, what does the Structure of Lives have to offer? It makes a
contribution on two levels:
1. It is of value to cognitive science because
• it offers a new way to illuminate everyday human experience, and
it does so without postulating processes inaccessible to that expe-
rience.
• it offers new directions for research on the perception of event
structure.
2. It is of value to the understanding of well-being because it raises many
new questions, of which two are:
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• To what degree does leakage between strands undermine well-
being?
• Does the Structure of Lives offer a better basis for assessing well-
being than other methods? It suggests that well-being might best
be assessed strand by strand, after which a global measure may be
formed by giving each strand a weight determined by the notewor-
thiness of its contents.
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